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Fifty Years of the Lanham Act:  A 
Retrospective of Section 43(a) 
Ethan Horwitz* 
Benjamin Levi** 
INTRODUCTION 
The Trademark Act of 19461 (“Lanham Act”) marks its fifti-
eth anniversary2 with a much broader scope than originally 
envisioned by Congress.  The expanded reach of the Lanham 
Act rests, in part, upon the growing prominence of its section 
43(a) (“section 43(a)”).3  Section 43(a) was initially interpreted 
as forbidding only “passing-off,”4 or the infringement or unau-
 
* Member, Darby & Darby, P.C., New York, NY.  Polytechnic Institute of 
New York, B.S. 1972; Courant Institute, New York University, M.S. 1974; St. 
John’s University, J.D. 1976. 
** Associate, Darby & Darby, P.C., New York, NY.  Boston University, B.S. 
1988; Northeastern University, J.D. 1996. 
1. Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West Supp. 1996)). 
2. The Lanham Act—named for Texas Congressman Fritz G. Lanham—was 
signed into law on July 5, 1946, and became effective exactly one year later.  Id. 
3. Section 43(a) states, in relevant part: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any 
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, 
or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, 
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representa-
tion of fact, which— 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as 
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another 
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, 
services or commercial activities by another person, or 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the na-
ture, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or an-
other person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in 
a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is likely to be dam-
aged by such act. 
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996). 
4. The early common law of trademark prevented only “passing off”—
defined then as palming off one producer’s goods as those of another.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. d (1995).  The term “pass-
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thorized use of a trademark.  Nonetheless, a half-century of 
expansive judicial interpretation and congressional amend-
ment have enlarged section 43(a) into a vehicle for prohibiting 
infringement of common law marks, trade dress infringement, 
false advertising—including trade libel and product dispar-
agement—and other practices falling within the rubric “unfair 
competition.”5 
This Essay highlights key areas in which section 43(a) has 
expanded.6  Part I briefly discusses the various trademark acts 
in effect before the Lanham Act, and the factors which led to 
the wholesale rewriting of the trademark statutes.  Part II sur-
veys the legislative history of the Lanham Act, including sec-
tion 43(a), and traces the expansion of section 43(a) over the 
years. This Essay concludes that the ongoing debate over the 
scope of section 43(a) will not diminish its importance in litiga-
tion related to unfair competition. 
I. PRE-LANHAM ACT 
Prior to the Lanham Act, federal trademark statutes were 
largely ineffective and had limited success.  Although marks to 
distinguish merchandise had long been protected under the 
common law and state statutes,7 Congress did not enact the 
                                                                                                                                  
ing off” is now used more broadly to describe any situation in which the conduct 
of a seller creates a likelihood that prospective purchasers will be confused as to 
the source of the goods or services.  Id. § 4 & cmt. b. 
5. The law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of de-
ceit; it generally was concerned with protecting consumers, and subsequently 
sellers also, from misrepresentation as to the source of goods or services.  Id. § 9; 
see also Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1917) 
(Hand, J.) (“[T]he plaintiff has the right not to lose his customers through false 
representations . . . . The defendant . . . may copy plaintiff’s goods slavishly 
down to the minutest detail; but he may not represent himself as the plaintiff in 
their sale.”). 
6. This Essay makes no attempt to present a comprehensive survey of the many 
and varied aspects of growth of Section 43(a); such a presentation would fill vol-
umes. 
7. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (“The right to adopt and use a 
symbol or a device to distinguish the goods or property made or sold by the person 
whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all other persons, has long been recog-
nized by the common law . . . .”); Coffeen v. Brunton, 5 F. Cas. 1184 (C.C.D. Ind. 
1849) (No. 2,946) (holding that the law prevents the adoption of another’s mark or 
label when it prevents the public from distinguishing between competitors’ prod-
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first federal trademark statute until 1870.8  That first foray into 
trademark protection proved unsuccessful; in the Trade-Mark 
Cases,9 the Supreme Court declared the 1870 statute unconsti-
tutional because it rested on the wrong congressional power.10  
The Court held that Congress had erred by basing the 1870 
statute on the Patent and Copyright Clause,11 because trade-
marks are materially different from patents and copyrights.12  
The Court stated that Congress could have based the 1870 
statute on the Commerce Clause,13 but had failed to do so.14 
Although Congress grounded subsequent trademark acts 
on the Commerce Clause, those pre-Lanham Act statutes were 
not completely successful or effective.  The first statute to fol-
low the Trade-Mark Cases was an 1881 act that limited federal 
trademark registration to marks used in commerce with for-
eign nations or the Indian tribes.15  That was followed by an-
other trademark law in 190516 and by a somewhat broader 
statute in 1920 (“1920 Act”).17 Section 3 of the 1920 Act prohib-
ited willful or intentional misrepresentation of the source of 
merchandise18—a prohibition that proved too restrictive to be 
                                                                                                                                  
ucts); see, e.g., Walton v. Crowley, 29 F. Cas. 138 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1856) (No. 17,133) 
(preventing the sale of sewing needles packaged under counterfeit replicas of a 
competitor’s labels); Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 744 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 
13,785) (preventing the sale of thread bearing counterfeit replicas of a competitor’s 
trademarks). 
8. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198. 
9. 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
10. Id. at 97-99. 
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that Congress shall have the power 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times, to Authors and Inventors, the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries”). 
12. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 97-99. 
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that Congress shall have the power 
“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes”). 
14. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 97-99 (declining to find that the law was 
based on the Commerce Clause absent any suggestion that Congress had in-
tended the law to regulate commerce among the states). 
15. Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502 (repealed 1946). 
16. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 (repealed 1946). 
17. Act of Mar. 19, 1920 (“1920 Act”), ch. 104, 41 Stat. 533 (repealed 1946). 
18. Section 3 of the 1920 Act stated: 
Any person who shall willfully and with intent to deceive, affix, apply, 
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of much use to litigants,19 but which did serve as the precursor 
to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.20 
The pre-Lanham Act statutes presented several problems 
for trademark holders, for those seeking to prevent unfair 
business practices, and for practitioners.  For example, the 
many separate acts combined to present a rather confusing 
amalgam of law; the statutes also failed to address adequately 
the protection of service marks; and trademark registrations 
did not expire—even where registrants did nothing to pre-
serve their marks.  Moreover, the pre-Lanham Act statutes al-
lowed a competitor to obtain relief in only a few situations:  (1) 
when the cause of action involved the tort of “passing-off;”21 
(2) when a competitor could demonstrate that his business was 
                                                                                                                                  
or annex, or use in connection with any article or articles of merchan-
dise, or any container or containers of the same, a false designation of 
origin, including words or other symbols, tending to falsely identify the 
origin of the merchandise, and shall then cause such merchandise to en-
ter into interstate or foreign commerce, . . . shall be liable to an action at 
law for damages and to an action in equity for an injunction, at the suit 
of any person, firm or corporation doing business in the locality falsely 
indicated as that of origin . . . . 
Id. § 3, at 534. 
19. Joseph P. Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition:  What Should Be the 
Reach of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 671, 679-80 (1984). 
20. As enacted, and until amended in 1988, section 43(a) stated that: 
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with 
any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false 
designation of origin, or any false description or representation, includ-
ing words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the 
same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, 
and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such desig-
nation of origin or description or representation cause or procure the 
same to be transported or used in commerce . . . shall be liable to a civil 
action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as 
that of origin . . . or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to 
be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988), amended by Federal Trademark Dilution Act Of 1995, Pub. 
L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985 (effective Jan. 16, 1996); Trademark Remedy 
Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, § 3(c), 106 Stat. 3567, 3568 (Oct. 27, 1992); 
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, Title I, sec. 132, § 
43(a), 102 Stat. 3935, 3946 (effective Nov. 16, 1989). 
21. See supra note 4 (defining “passing off”); see also American Washboard 
Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900) (beginning a line of cases that 
made “palming off” essential to any recovery). 
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the “single source” of goods which were alleged to have been 
falsely advertised;22 or (3) when a competitor joined with oth-
ers similarly affected to protest the misuse of a designation of 
geographical origin.23 
Those and other problems with the many trademark acts of 
the time fueled a movement to completely rewrite the trade-
mark laws.  Consequently, after many years of delay, Congress 
passed the Lanham Act on July 5, 1946, repealing the acts of 
1881, 1905, and 1920. 
II. THE LANHAM ACT 
A. Legislative History 
Although the legislative history of section 43(a) is limited 
and “inconclusive,”24 the record is complete enough to reveal 
the congressional intent behind the steady expansion of section 
43(a). For example, comparison of the statutory language of 
section 43(a) with that of its 1920 predecessor25 shows that 
Congress intended to eliminate a showing of willfulness or in-
tent to deceive as a prerequisite for winning a trademark pro-
tection action.26  Congress also provided a cause of action for 
false advertising by inserting into section 43(a) the words “any 
false description or representation,”27 whereas its predecessor, 
 
22. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of America, 254 U.S. 143, 146 (1920) 
(Holmes, J.) (“[Coca-Cola] means a single thing coming from a single source, and 
well known to the community.  It hardly would be too much to say that the 
drink characterizes the name as much as the name the drink.”); DuPont Cello-
phane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 6 F. Supp. 859, 884 (E.D.N.Y. 1934) (“The 
name ‘Cellophane’ characterizes a single thing coming from a single source, and 
is a trademark, even if . . . the identity of the producer was unknown.”), modified, 
85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936). 
23. Kenneth B. Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act:  You’ve Come A Long Way, Baby—Too Far, Maybe? 49 IND. L.J. 84 (1973), reprinted 
in 64 TRADEMARK REP. 193 (1974). 
24. Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 690 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). 
25. See supra notes 18, 20 (quoting section 3 of the 1920 Act and section 43(a) as 
enacted). 
26. See Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 648 & n.7 (3d 
Cir. 1958) (noting that the willfulness and intent provisions of the 1920 Act were 
purposefully excluded from the Lanham Act). 
27. See supra note 20 (quoting section 43(a) as enacted). 
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section 3 of the 1920 Act,28 was limited to false designations of 
origin.  The Lanham Act also was intended to re-introduce a 
general federal law of unfair competition in response to the 
seminal case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,29 which effectively 
wiped out the existing body of federal common law pertaining 
to unfair competition.30 
B. Initial Years 
Section 43(a) initially played a small role in litigation re-
lated to unfair competition.31  Nonetheless, section 43(a) has 
grown to take a leading position in enforcing rights encom-
passed within the term “unfair competition.” 
During its first seven years, section 43(a) generally was 
construed as a codification of pre-Lanham Act law.  Conse-
quently, the application of section 43(a) was restricted to ac-
tions for “passing-off” or actions which “include only such 
false descriptions or representations as are of substantially the 
same economic nature as those which involve infringement or 
other improper use of trade-marks.”32  That limited application 
 
28. See supra note 18 (quoting section 3 of the 1920 Act). 
29. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
30. See Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 782 (N.D. Ill. 1974) 
(“Congress undoubtedly recognized and intended to remedy the destructive effect 
that Erie v. Tompkins had upon the development of a uniform federal common law of 
unfair competition which was essential in a nation where interstate commerce was 
dominant.”) (citation omitted).  After Erie, litigants could still seek protection under 
state laws regulating unfair competition and unfair trade practices; state laws remain 
an option for trademark litigants today.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994) (reserving ex-
clusive federal jurisdiction over patents and copyrights, but not over trademark pro-
tection); Union Mfg. Co. v. Han Baek Trading Co., 763 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(“[T]he jurisdiction of federal district courts over unfair trade practice and trademark 
cases is not exclusive.”). 
31. Section 43(a) was initially overshadowed, in part, by section 44(b), (h), and 
(i) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b), (h), (i) (“section 44”), which was originally 
interpreted as creating a substantive federal law of unfair competition in interstate 
commerce.  See Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F.2d 962, 964, 966 (9th Cir. 1950) (stating that 15 
U.S.C. § 1126(b), (h), and (i) granted federal jurisdiction over unfair competition and 
trademark protection in interstate commerce).  That view of section 44 did not pre-
vail, due, in part, to the subsequent expansion of the applicability of section 43(a).  
See L’Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954) (beginning 
a line of cases that expanded the scope of section 43(a)). 
32. Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat’l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D. Mass. 
1949) (“[Section 43(a)] should not be interpreted so as to bring within its scope any 
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began to expand with the landmark case of L’Aiglon Apparel, 
Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc.,33 which broadened the scope of section 
43(a) by finding that it created a new, statutory tort.34 
Although the L’Aiglon Apparel view of section 43(a) soon 
found adherents,35 some courts were not yet ready to accept 
change.  For example, in Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Mater-
nity Shop, Inc.,36 the influential United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit avoided considering whether section 
43(a) created a federal law of unfair competition,37 and instead 
ruled that 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) had conferred pendant jurisdic-
tion over the unfair competition claim.38  Chief Judge Clark 
concurred in the decision, but nonetheless lamented that the 
legal profession had so far failed to perceive the full potential 
of section 43(a).39  As Judge Clark predicted, section 43(a) has 
                                                                                                                                  
kind of undesirable business practice which involves deception, when such practices 
are outside the field of the trade-mark laws, and especially when such undesirable 
practices are already the subject of other Congressional legislation . . . .”), aff’d per cu-
riam, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950). 
33. 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954). 
34. The L’Aiglon Apparel court stated: 
We find nothing in the legislative history of the Lanham Act to justify 
the view that [section 43(a)] is merely declarative of existing law.  In-
deed, because we find no ambiguity in the relevant language in the 
statute we would doubt the propriety of resort to legislative history 
even if that history suggested that Congress intended less than it said.  
It seems to us that Congress has defined a statutory civil wrong of false 
representation of goods in commerce and has given a broad class of 
suitors injured or likely to be injured by such wrong the right to relief in 
the federal courts.  This statutory tort is defined in language which dif-
ferentiates it in some particulars from similar wrongs which have de-
veloped and have become defined in the judge made law of unfair 
competition. 
Id. at 651. 
35. See Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 940 (D.D.C. 1955) (stating that 
section 43(a) creates a federal statutory tort, sui generis), aff’d sub nom. S.C. Johnson & 
Son, Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956); 
Mutation Mink Breeders Ass’n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 
1959) (stating that section 43(a) does not merely codify the common law principles of 
unfair competition). 
36. 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956). 
37. Id. at 540 n.1. 
38. Id. at 543. 
39. In predicting that section 43(a) would have a major impact on litigation re-
lated to unfair competition, Judge Clark stated: 
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become an effective tool to remedy many acts of unfair compe-
tition. 
C. Growth of Section 43(a) 
Since its initial expansion in L’Aiglon Apparel, section 43(a) 
has continued to grow in scope.  Courts have extended the 
reach of section 43(a) to include infringement of common law 
marks and trade dress infringement.  The courts also have in-
terpreted “false advertising” broadly enough to apply to false 
claims about the claimant’s products.  Moreover, Congress 
amended section 43(a) in 1988 to include trade libel and prod-
uct disparagement—defined as false claims about a competi-
tor’s product.  The 1988 amendments also codified previous 
judicial interpretations of the statute.  The remainder of this 
Essay discusses those significant areas of judicial expansion 
and the 1988 amendments. 
1. False Designations of Origin 
Section 43(a) protects both registered40 and unregistered41 
trademarks.  The unregistered or common law trademarks 
were first held to be within the scope of section 43(a) in Joshua 
Meier Co. v. Albany Novelty Manufacturing Co.42  There, the Sec-
ond Circuit stated that a defendant’s use of common law or 
unregistered trademarks may constitute a false designation of 
origin and a false description and representation in violation of 
                                                                                                                                  
I do not see how we can avoid the clear federal jurisdiction arising un-
der the new and quite extensive provision covering the false description 
or representation of goods introduced into commerce.  By the broad and 
liberal construction properly given this remedial legislation . . . the re-
lief here granted would be supported under federal law.  I think we 
must consider the applicability of this statute, and cannot avoid it, even 
though counsel does not cite it; for we are bound by the law of the 
land . . . . Indeed, there is indication here and elsewhere that the bar has 
not yet realized the potential impact of this statutory provision 
Id. at 546 (Clark, C.J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
40. See, e.g., Guess? v. Mai-Tai Boutique, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1387 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988) (protecting the registered trademarks of Guess? clothing). 
41. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (“[Section] 43(a) 
protects qualifying unregistered trademarks . . . .”); see also Boston Prof’l Hockey 
Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1010 (5th Cir.) (“Under [sec-
tion 43(a)], the registration of a mark is not a prerequisite of recovery . . . .”), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). 
42. 236 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1956). 
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section 43(a), provided: 
[T]he alleged unregistered trademarks used by the 
plaintiff are so associated with its goods that the use of 
the same or similar marks by another company consti-
tutes a representation that its goods come from the 
same source.  [Section 43(a)] requires at least that the 
defendant be guilty of a false representation.  If the ex-
pressions used here by the defendant are not uniquely 
associated with the plaintiff’s goods there is no such 
false representation.43 
Since Joshua Meier, other courts have applied section 43(a) 
to protect a variety of unregistered or common law marks or 
trade names,44 including marks created under state law if used 
in interstate commerce,45 abandoned marks that are reused,46 
marks that have been denied registration,47 marks whose regis-
trability is pending at time of litigation,48 and unregistered 
 
43. Id. at 147. 
44. See, e.g., Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. United Merchants and Mfrs., Inc., 173 F. 
Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (granting section 43(a) protection to “Jollitop” women’s 
blouses because that brand name had become widely known as the plaintiff’s exclu-
sive trademark). 
45. See, e.g., Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist., 889 F.2d 1018 
(11th Cir. 1989) (enjoining competing use of a trademark registered under Flor-
ida’s trademark law); see also La Societe Anonyme des Parfums Le Galion v. Jean 
Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1271 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1974) (recognizing that “choice of law 
presents no real problems, since trademark use is accepted as a general common-law 
requirement [for trademark protection], with no discernible modulations from juris-
diction to jurisdiction”). 
46. See, e.g., Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Sed Non Olet Denarius, 
Ltd., 817 F. Supp. 1103, 1131-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that reuse does not cure 
abandonment of a trademark, but instead generates new, albeit limited, trademark 
rights from the date of reuse), vacated pursuant to settlement, 859 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994), cited in L. & J.G. Stickley, Inc. v. Canal Dover Furniture Co., 79 F.3d 258 (2d 
Cir. 1996); Sutton Cosmetics (P.R.), Inc. v. Lander Co., 455 F.2d 285, 288 (2d Cir. 
1972) (stating that the first bona fide user of an abandoned mark acquires trademark 
rights in the areas in which he uses the mark). 
47. See, e.g., Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Detroit Forming, Inc., 743 F.2d 1039 (4th 
Cir. 1984) (allowing a plastics manufacturer to claim trademark protection for its ba-
nana split and ice cream sundae dishes, even though trademark registration had 
been denied). 
48. See, e.g., Marvel Comics, Ltd. v. Defiant, 837 F. Supp. 546, 548-49 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993) (allowing a comic book publisher to claim trademark protection for its new 
superhero while its trademark registration application was still pending). 
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trade names49—notwithstanding the fact that Congress did not 
explicitly include those types of false designations within the 
scope of section 43(a). 
Courts also have applied section 43(a) to common law 
marks other than trademarks.  For example, Iding v. Anaston50 
held common law service marks to be within the scope of sec-
tion 43(a). The Iding court affirmed that section 43(a) had cre-
ated “a new federal remedy . . . subject to certain express limi-
tations, which does not require ownership of a United States 
[trademark] registration.”51  Accordingly, the court found that 
“infringement of a common law service mark is cognizable 
under [section] 43(a) . . . where the mark or goods are in some 
way caused to enter into interstate commerce.”52  It also has 
been held that section 43(a) applies to common law certifica-
tion marks.53 
Trade dress was held protectable under section 43(a) in 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Royal-Pioneer Paper Box Manufacturing 
 
49. See, e.g., Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(“Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act . . . generally has been construed to protect against 
trademark, service mark, and trade name infringement even though the mark or 
name has not been federally registered.”) (emphasis added); Accuride Int’l, Inc. v. 
Accuride Corp., 871 F.2d 1531, 1534 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that trade names are pro-
tected by section 43(a), even though they cannot be registered like trademarks). 
50. 266 F. Supp. 1015 (N.D. Ill. 1967). 
51. Id. at 1017-18. 
52. Id. at 1019.  Although the Iding court stressed that section 43(a) applied to 
service marks only in interstate commerce, it now appears clear that likelihood of 
confusion is sufficient to bring even an intrastate use of a service mark within the 
scope of section 43(a), provided such use has a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce.  World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell’s New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 488-
89 (5th Cir. 1971); see generally 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27.06[3] (3d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the 
Lanham Act amendments, effective in 1989, which shifted the focus from a require-
ment that goods or services themselves have an effect on interstate commerce to a 
requirement that designation or advertisement of the goods have an effect on inter-
state commerce). 
53. Florida v. Real Juices, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 428, 431 (M.D. Fla. 1971) (finding the 
scope of section 43(a) sufficiently broad to protect unregistered common law certifi-
cation marks).  Section 45 of the Lanham Act defines a certification mark as “any 
word, name, symbol, or device . . . used [or intended to be used] by a person other 
than its owner . . . to certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, 
quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of . . . goods or services.”  15 U.S.C.A. § 
1127 (West Supp. 1996). 
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Co.54  There, plaintiff Eastman Kodak sought to enjoin defen-
dant from the manufacture and sale of photographic film 
boxes.  The court granted injunctive relief under section 43(a), 
stating that “[d]efendant’s packages . . . constitute an unfair 
use of [plaintiff’s] trade dress.”55  Since Eastman Kodak, other 
cases have also held trade dress to be protectable under section 
43(a).56 
The judicial interpretations of section 43(a) with respect to 
false designations of origin finally became so widespread and 
accepted that Congress codified them in the Trademark Law 
Revision Act of 1988 (“Trademark Revision Act”).57 
2. False or Misleading Descriptions or  
 Representations 
Although the 1988 redrafting of section 43(a) provided 
statutory language protecting both registered and unregistered 
marks, a more precise description of section 43(a)’s scope 
would be that it protects without regard to trademark rights.58  
That is, section 43(a) not only prohibits trademark infringe-
ment, but also casts its wide net around any “false or mislead-
ing description of fact, or false or misleading representation of 
fact, which . . . in commercial advertising or promotion, mis-
represents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic 
origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or 
commercial activities.”59  That prong of section 43(a), also writ-
 
54. 197 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1961). 
55. Id. at 133. 
56. Two Pesos Inc., 505 U.S. at 769, 774 (finding that inherently distinctive trade 
dress is protectable under section 43(a) without proof of secondary meaning); see 
L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe, Inc., 988 F.2d 1117 (Fed. Cir.) (finding that trade 
dress involving the total image of a product is protectable under section 43(a), under 
liberal principles of construction, provided that the trade dress is non-functional and 
is distinctive or has otherwise acquired secondary meaning), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 908 
(1993). 
57. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 
(effective Nov. 16, 1989). 
58. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[S]imple 
claims of false representations in advertising are actionable under section 43(a) 
when brought by competitors of the wrongdoer, even though they do not in-
volve misuse of a trademark.”), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1080 (1993). 
59. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1). 
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ten into law as part of the Trademark Revision Act, was in-
tended to codify judicial interpretations given section 43(a) be-
fore the 1988 amendments.60 
Because the terms “false or misleading description of fact” 
and “false or misleading representation of fact” were new to 
section 43(a), they were originally open to judicial interpreta-
tion.  Nonetheless, it is generally accepted that this second 
prong of section 43(a) covers statements which are literally 
false, as well as statements which, although literally true, cre-
ate false impressions.61  That interpretation is consistent with 
interpretations given section 43(a) before the 1988 amend-
ments.  For example, in American Home Products Corp. v. Johnson 
& Johnson,62 the court reasoned that limiting the reach of sec-
tion 43(a) to literal falsehoods would allow false advertisers to 
circumvent the statute by finding clever ways to mislead.63 
 
60. See ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 964 & n.6 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990) (noting that the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 sharpened section 
43(a)’s focus on “false and deceptive advertising” regarding designation of origin). 
61. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 930 F. Supp. 753, 779 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(stating that section 43(a) covers either advertisements that are literally false, or 
though literally true, are likely to mislead and confuse).  For example, even though it 
is literally true to say that the winner of a two-person race finished “next to last,” 
such a statement is clearly misleading; it creates a false impression if no other infor-
mation is given from which one could determine that the person who finished “next 
to last” also finished in first place.  See Mutation Mink Breeders Ass’n, 23 F.R.D. at 162 
(stating that the likelihood of public deception is an issue of fact to be resolved by 
considering all relevant circumstances). 
62. 577 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1978) 
63. The American Home Products court stated: 
That [s]ection 43(a) of the Lanham Act encompasses more than lit-
eral falsehoods cannot be questioned.  Were it otherwise, clever use of 
innuendo, indirect intimations, and ambiguous suggestions could 
shield the advertisement from scrutiny precisely when protection 
against such sophisticated deception is most needed. . . . 
If a statement is actually false, relief can be granted . . . without 
reference to the reaction of the buyer or consumer of the prod-
uct. . . . [But where] a statement acknowledged to be literally 
true and grammatically correct nevertheless has a tendency to mis-
lead, confuse or deceive. . . . ‘[T]he public’s reaction to [the] ad-
vertisement will be the starting point in any discussion of the 
likelihood of deception.’ 
Id. at 165 (quoting American Brands, Inc. v. R. J. Reynolds Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352, 
1356-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)) (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
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Prior to the Trademark Revision Act, courts held that false 
statements claiming patent or copyright protection for a prod-
uct or item constituted false advertising that is actionable un-
der section 43(a).64  It is important to note, however, that sec-
tion 43(a) has been held not to prohibit false claims of 
trademark rights.65  Pre-1988 judicial interpretations of section 
43(a) also limited actionable false statements to claims about 
one’s own goods or services; consequently section 43(a) did 
not provide a cause of action for false statements or representa-
tions about a competitor’s goods or services.66  The Trademark 
Revision Act changed that by expanding section 43(a) to in-
clude trade libel and product disparagement.67 
 
64. John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1976), rev’d in 
part on other grounds sub nom. Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 
1978); Kuddle Toy, Inc. v. Pussycat-Toy Co., 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 642, 665 (E.D.N.Y. 
1974) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that section 43(a) ought to be limited to the trade-
mark context, stating that “the language of section 43(a) will not accept that sort of 
reading”).  In John Wright, the court concluded that an advertising brochure violated 
section 43(a) by subtly, but falsely, suggesting that the defendant held patents on 
both the original and reproductions of penny banks.  The court described the false-
hood as “a material misrepresentation of quality which tends to deceive an ordinary 
purchaser in the exercise of ordinary care . . . .”  419 F. Supp at 327. 
65. See La Societe Anonyme des Parfums Le Galion, 495 F.2d at 1270 n.6 (stating that 
section 43(a) is intended to reach false advertising violations, not false registration 
claims); Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Computer Automation, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 424, 
429 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that false claim of trademark rights provided no cause 
of action under section 43(a), where the false representation was not made in connec-
tion with goods or services that entered into commerce, nor achieved any unfairly 
competitive effect). 
66. See, e.g., Bernard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279, 1283 (7th 
Cir. 1969) (holding that false advertising or representations made by a defendant 
about a plaintiff’s product are not covered by section 43(a)), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 
(1970).  But see Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 782 n.10 (N.D. Ill. 
1974) (following the holding in Bernard Food, but nevertheless declaring that it was 
illogical not to enforce section 43(a) where one makes false representations against a 
competitor, because the buying public would still tend to be misled about the rela-
tive merits and qualities of the products). 
67. 15 U.S.C.A. 1125(a)(1) (“Any person who . . . uses . . . false or misleading 
representation of fact, which . . . misrepresents the nature . . . of his or her or another 
person’s goods . . . shall be liable . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Gordon & Breach 
Science Publishers, S.A. v. American Inst. of Physics, 859 F. Supp. 1521, 1530 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that trade libel and product disparagement became action-
able under the 1988 amendments to section 43(a)). 
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CONCLUSION 
Once interpreted as prohibiting only “passing-off,” section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act has increased in scope to include in-
fringement of common law marks, trade dress infringement, 
and false advertising—including trade libel and product dis-
paragement.  Nonetheless, section 43(a)’s considerable expan-
sion during the past fifty years has yet to transform it into a 
catch-all statute covering all causes of action related to unfair 
competition.  For example, section 43(a) does not provide a 
cause of action for trade secret violations.  Contractual disputes 
also remain generally outside the scope of section 43(a), as do 
false claims of trademark rights. 
Whether section 43(a) ought to expand or contract in scope 
has been a much debated issue.  Many factors may influence 
the future reach of section 43(a), including the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of “interstate commerce,” the interpreta-
tion that the courts place on the new amendment, effective in 
1996, extending section 43(a)’s protection of trademark dilu-
tion, and the ingenuity of practitioners to argue for either the 
broadening or narrowing of the section.  Whatever the future 
scope of section 43(a), at least one thing is certain; section 43(a) 
promises to remain at the forefront of unfair competition re-
lated litigation. 
